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90-1596.ZS
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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
ROBERTSON, CHIEF, UNITED STATES FOREST
SERVICE, et al. v. SEATTLE AUDUBON SOCIETY
et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 90-1596. Argued December 2, 1991-Decided March 25, 1992
Respondent environmental groups filed separate lawsuits challenging
proposed timber harvesting in certain forests managed by the United
States Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).
These forests are home to the northern spotted owl, an endangered
species. Between them, the two lawsuits alleged violations of five
federal statutes. The lower courts preliminarily enjoined some of the
challenged harvesting. In response to this ongoing litigation, Con-
gress enacted 318 of the Department of the Interior and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, also known as the Northwest
Timber Compromise. Section 318 both required harvesting and
expanded harvesting restrictions. Subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5)
prohibited harvesting altogether in various designated areas, and
subsection (b)(6)(A) stated in part that ``Congress hereby determines
and directs that management [of the forests] according to subsections
(b)(3) and (b)(5) . . . is adequate consideration for the purpose of
meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for [the two
cases,]'' which were identified by name and caption number. Both
District Courts rejected respondents' claims that subsection (b)(6)(A)
violated Article III by purporting to direct results in two pending
cases. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the provision unconsti-
tutional under United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, on the ground
that Congress directed a particular decision in the cases without
repealing or amending the statutes underlying the litigation.
Held:Subsection (b)(6)(A) does not violate Article III. Pp.7-11.
(a)The provision compelled changes in law, not results under old
law, by replacing the legal standards underlying the two original
cases with those set forth in subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5). Before its
enactment, respondents' claims would fail only if the challenged
harvesting violated none of the provisions of the five statutes that
formed the basis for the original lawsuits. Under subsection (b)(6)(A),
however, the claims would fail if the harvesting satisfied both of two
new provisions. Thus, subsection (b)(6)(A)'s operation modified the
old provisions. Moreover, there is nothing in the subsection that pur-
ported to direct any particular findings of fact or applications of law
to fact. Section 318 reserved judgment on the lawfulness of the
timber sales under old law. It did not instruct the courts whether
any particular timber sales would violate subsections (b)(3) or (b)(5);
and it could not instruct that any particular BLM timber sales were
lawful, because subsection (b)(5) incorporated by reference the
harvesting prohibitions imposed by a BLM agreement not yet in
existence when the Compromise was enacted. Pp.7-9.
(b)The three textual features of subsection (b)(6)(A) cited by
respondents do not support their argument that the provision direct-
ed findings under old law, rather than supplying new law. The
inclusion of the preface ``Congress . . . directs that'' does not under-
mine the conclusion that what Congress directed-to both courts and
agencies-was a change in law. Nor is it significant that the subsec-
tion deemed compliance with the new requirements to ``mee[t]'' the
old requirements. Although Congress could have modified the old
laws directly, its enactment of an entirely separate statute modified
the old laws through operation of the canon that specific provisions
qualify general ones. Finally, the subsection's explicit reference to
the two pending cases served only to identify the five statutory
requirements that were the basis for those cases. Pp.9-10.
(c)The Court of Appeals' alternative holding that the provision
could not effect an implied modification of substantive law because
it was embedded in an appropriations measure is also without merit.
Congress may amend a substantive law in an appropriations statute
if it does so clearly, see, e. g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,
222, and it did so explicitly here. In addition, having determined
that the provision would be unconstitutional unless it modified
previously existing law, the court was obligated to impose that saving
interpretation as long as it was a possible one. See NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30. Pp.10-11.
(d)Since subsection (b)(6)(A) did amend applicable law, there is no
reason to address the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Klein. The
argument of one of respondents' amici-that the provision is uncon-
stitutional even if it amended law because it swept no more, or little
more, broadly than the range of applications at issue in the pending
cases-was not raised below, squarely considered by the Court of
Appeals, or advanced by respondents here. P.11.
914 F.2d 1311, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.